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NO ANGELS IN ACADEME: ENDING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERENCE TO PUBLIC 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
WILLIAM E. THRO* 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself. —James Madison1 
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 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). Madison’s views on the nature of 
humanity and the need to control the government reflect the influence of John Witherspoon, 
arguably the greatest Calvinist thinker of the Eighteenth Century and Madison’s graduate 
tutor in Hebrew and political philosophy. See Ian Spier, The Calvinist Roots of American 
Social Order: Calvin, Witherspoon, and Madison, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 13, 2017), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/04/19116/. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution reflects a Calvinist perspective2—a fundamental 
distrust of humans and human institutions.3 Neither the People nor the 
People’s Agents are angels;4 they are flawed individuals who will pursue 
                                                 
 2. As Mark David Hall demonstrated, Calvinist theology (sometimes called reformed 
theology) was one of the foundations of the Constitution. MARK DAVID HALL, ROGER 
SHERMAN AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 12-40 (2013). This is not to 
discount the influence of Locke or Montesquieu, but simply to acknowledge the Framing 
Generation had great awareness of the Calvinist thread of the Protestant tradition. As Hall 
explained, “American leaders were familiar with Locke, but few thought his political 
philosophy was at odds with traditional Christian or Calvinist political ideas.” Id. at 24. 
Rather, “Locke’s political philosophy is best understood as a logical extension of Protestant 
resistance literature rather than as a radical departure from it.” Id. at 21. 
 3. As Professor Hamilton explained: 
One of the dominating themes of Calvin’s theology is the fundamental distrust 
of human motives, beliefs, and actions. On Calvin’s terms, there is never a 
moment in human history when that which is human can be trusted blindly as 
a force for good. Humans may try to achieve good, but there are no tricks, no 
imaginative role-playing, and no social organizations that can guarantee the 
generation of good. . . . Thus, Calvinism counsels in favor of diligent 
surveillance of one’s own and other’s actions, and it also presupposes the value 
of the law (both biblical and secular) to guide human behavior away from its 
propensity to do wrong. 
 
Marci Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the Constitutional 
Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSP. ON LEGAL THOUGHT 189, 189 (Michael W. McConnell, 
Robert F. Corchran, Jr., & Angela C. Carmella, eds., 2001). 
 4. In contrast, those who advocated for a new European Constitution viewed 
humanity as inherently good. See GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL (2005). 
Robert Keegan has suggested that the foreign policy disputes between the United States and 
Europe are a product of different perspectives on humanity. See ROBERT KEEGAN, OF 
PARADISE AND POWER (2003). 
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self-interest, abuse power, and engage in corruption.5 The Constitution 
protects the liberty of the People—individually and collectively—from the 
People’s Agents and the ever-shifting political winds.6 Instead of an all-
powerful national government,7 the Constitution “split the atom of 
sovereignty . . . establishing two orders of government, each with its own 
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”8 Rather than 
combining executive, legislative, and judicial power in a single parliament 
dominated by the majority party of the day, 9 the Constitution “protects us 
from our own best intentions” by preventing the concentration of “power in 
one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”10 Because 
“all . . . are created equal and endowed by their creator with certain 
unalienable rights,”11 the Constitution “withdraws certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy” and “places them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials.”12 
When the Will of the People’s Agents as expressed in the statutes or 
executive actions contradicts the Will of the People as expressed in the 
                                                 
 5. See R.C. SPROUL, WILLING TO BELIEVE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER FREE WILL 52-
55 (1997). 
 6. See RANDY BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY & 
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
 7. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). 
 8. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 9. South Africa’s Constitution illustrates this point. First, Constitutional Court—the 
highest judicial body—is commanded to “promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
Second, a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly can amend most provisions of the 
Constitution at any time. Id. If one party holds more than two-thirds of the seats—a common 
occurrence during the first two decades of multi-racial democracy—revision of the nation’s 
fundamental law can be accomplished by a single political party. Id. Third, the National 
Assembly—the legislature—is elected by proportional representation, which allows parties with 
low levels of support to obtain seats. Id. Fourth, because the President is the leader of the party 
or the coalition that has a majority in the National Assembly, there is neither a legislative check 
on the executive nor an executive check on the legislature. See id. Fifth, although South Africa is 
nominally a federation, the individual provinces are subordinate to the will of the National 
Government, which, as explained above, is controlled by democratic majorities. See id. 
 Of course, South Africa does have a comprehensive Bill of Rights and the Constitutional 
Court vigorously enforces those rights. Indeed, the Constitutional Court invalidated the initial 
Constitution. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) 
SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.). However, this judicial check is the only real check on the power of a 
democratic majority. For South Africa, the Bill of Rights creates limits on government rather 
than merely confirming the limits that are implicit in the structure. In that sense, South Africa is 
fundamentally different from the Augustinian vision embodied in the United States Constitution. 
 10. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992). 
 11. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 12. W. Va State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
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Constitution,13 then the judiciary must ensure that the Constitution prevails.14 
Because judicial review is inherently anti-democratic15 and because judges 
are flawed humans16 who also need to be limited,17 the judiciary must apply 
the original public meaning of the constitutional text18 or, when such an 
interpretation is inconclusive, a constitutional construction consistent with 
the original public meaning.19 Judicial review must recognize constitutional 
actors are humans, not angels; there must be doubt, not deference.20 Although 
there have been occasions or even eras when the Court has failed the 
                                                 
 13. Although we frequently say that a statute or executive action violates the 
Constitution, only constitutional actors—human beings—can violate the Constitution. A 
claim that a statute violates the Constitution is really a claim that the legislature violated the 
Constitution. A claim that an executive action violates the Constitution is really a claim that 
a particular executive branch official violated the Constitution. See Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010); Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011); see also 
William E. Thro, Rosenkranz’ Constitutional Subjects & School Finance Litigation, 260 ED. 
LAW REP. 1 (2010) (applying Rosenkranz’ theory to school finance litigation). 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 15. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
4 (1982). 
 16. Recognizing the dangers of rule by a “bevy of platonic guardians,” Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing LEARNED HAND, THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS (1958)), judges are not “omni-compete[nt]” and, thus, cannot micromanage 
government departments. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 536 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 17. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 
(1989). See also RALPH ROSSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 
27-29 (2006). 
 18. While originalism offers the best method of restraint, its effectiveness ultimately 
depends upon the willingness of the judge to be restrained. If a judge wishes to refrain from 
imposing his policy views, then adhering to originalism is one way—the best way—to reach 
that result. Will Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 19. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004). 
 20. For an analysis of these contrasting approaches in the context of a state 
constitutional challenge to a school finance system, see William E. Thro & Carlee Poston 
Escue, Doubt or Deference: Comparing the South Dakota and Washington School Finance 
Decisions, 281 EDUC. L. REP. 771 (2012). 
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Republic,21 the Court generally has enforced the division of sovereignty,22 
the separation of powers,23 and the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.24 
Yet, with respect to academe, a different constitutional paradigm 
prevails. In the view of the judiciary, higher education administrators are 
“angels”—entitled to greater deference than constitutional actors in other 
spheres.25 For example, constitutional actors in academe may: (1) utilize 
racial classifications for different purposes and with far greater deference;26 
(2) force religious groups to admit those who disagree with the group’s basic 
faith tenets;27 and (3) impose life-altering punishments with little due process 
protections.28 
                                                 
 21. While there is general agreement that the Court has failed in its role, there is 
profound disagreement as to which cases or eras represent failure. The landmark beacon of 
liberty for some is a constitutional betrayal for others. 
 22. Because “the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure 
and plays too vital a role in securing freedom,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring), the Court has intervened to 
maintain the sovereign prerogatives of both the States and the National Government. In 
order to preserve the sovereignty of the National Government, the Court has prevented the 
States from imposing term limits on members of Congress, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 800-01 (1995), and instructing members of Congress as to how to vote on 
certain issues, Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 519-22, (2001). Similarly, it has invalidated 
state laws that infringe on the right to travel, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), undermine 
the Nation’s foreign policy, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-74 
(2000), and exempt a State from generally applicable regulations of interstate commerce, 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000). Conversely, recognizing that “the erosion of 
state sovereignty is likely to occur a step at a time,” South Carolina v. Baker 485 U.S. 505, 
533 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has declared that the National 
Government may not compel the States to pass particular legislation, New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992), require state officials to enforce federal law, Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), dictate the location of the State Capitol, Coyle v. 
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911), or regulate purely local matters, United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3. 
 23. “The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws 
enacted by Congress; the President, it says, ‘shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,’ personally and through officers whom he appoints. . . .” Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. 
Thus, Congress may not interfere with the President’s enforcement of the law, see 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and the President 
may not interfere with Congress’ ability to legislate. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 
(1998). 
 24. Although various justices have disagreed as to exactly how the Bill of Rights 
applies to the States, the Court has found that virtually all of the Bill of Rights applies to the 
States. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759-61 (2010). 
 25. To be sure, there are some contexts—notably the Freedom of Speech—where the 
judiciary treats higher education administrators in the same manner as other constitutional 
actors. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(holding that public university violated First Amendment by excluding religious publication 
from university’s funding mechanism). 
 26. See infra Part I(A). 
 27. See infra Part I(B). 
 28. See infra Part I(C). 
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This Article’s thesis is simple—because public university 
administrators are no more angelic than other constitutional actors are, the 
judiciary’s deference to higher education officials must end. There is no 
reason for greater deference to the academy than to other governmental units. 
Instead, judges must subject higher education administrators to the same 
skepticism and doubt as other constitutional actors. 
This Article has three parts. Part I examines how the Courts treat 
academe’s constitutional actors more deferentially than constitutional actors 
in other spheres. Specifically, it discusses different approaches concerning 
racial preferences, student religious groups’ freedom of association, and due 
process for students facing life-altering penalties. Part II details the 
consequences of the judiciary’s unwarranted deference to higher education. 
Racial preferences have significant costs, frequently do not help 
disadvantaged students, and are not necessary to the achievement of racial 
diversity. Forcing religious groups to admit non-believers undermines 
Confident Pluralism. Diminishing due process protections does nothing to 
help sexual assault victim-survivors. Part III details the possibility of ending 
this judicial deference to higher education through state constitutional 
provisions, federal statutory or regulatory changes, or overruling existing 
Supreme Court precedents. In particular, it explores the likelihood racial 
preferences in higher education will be treated the same as racial preferences 
in other context, student religious groups will have the associational rights as 
religious organizations outside of academe, and due process protections will 
be enhanced. 
I. THE JUDICIARY’S DEFERENCE TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
OFFICIALS 
A. Racial Preferences in Admissions 
The Equal Protection Clause,29 is “essentially a direction that all 
persons similarly situated . . . be treated alike,”30 and that the Constitution 
protects “persons, not groups.”31 Indeed, the “rights created by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. 
The rights established are personal rights.”32 If a program treats everyone 
equally, there is no equal protection violation.33 The “general rule is that 
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification 
                                                 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 30. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 31. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original); 
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986). 
 32. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (emphasis omitted). 
 33. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (restating that the Equal Protection 
Clause enforces the principle that the Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among its 
citizens). 
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drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”34 This 
general rule gives way in those rare instances when statutes infringe upon 
fundamental constitutional rights or utilize “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” 
classifications.35 
“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden 
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged 
by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”36 
Indeed, because racial distinctions “are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality”37 and 
are “contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect,”38 “all 
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny.”39 The government’s desire to use racial classifications to help 
racial minorities does not alter the analysis.40 Indeed, the Court has “insisted 
on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial 
classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies, race-
based preferences in government contracts, and race-based districting 
intended to improve minority representation.”41 Instead of presuming that 
governmental action is constitutional42 and requiring the challenger to 
demonstrate otherwise,43 “the government has the burden of proving that 
racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling 
governmental interests.’”44 
Outside of the higher education context, there is only one compelling 
interest that would justify the use of race—remedying the present day effects 
of identified past intentional racial discrimination by a particular 
governmental unit.45 Just as significantly, the Court has rejected, as a matter 
of constitutional law, a number of other justifications offered by state and 
local governments for race-conscious measures: maintaining a racial balance 
in K-12 education,46 remedying societal discrimination,47 and providing 
                                                 
 34. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 
(1981); U.S. R.R. Ret. Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). 
 35. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. 
 36. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000). 
 37. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
 38. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100). 
 39. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 40. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9 (1982). 
 41. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). 
 42. Lyng v. Auto. Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988). 
 43. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993). 
 44. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). 
 45. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504-05 (1989). 
 46. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720-
21 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 47. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
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minority K-12 students with faculty role models.48 If the government asserts 
there are present day effects of past intentional discrimination, there must be 
specific findings49 of actual present-day effects of past discrimination.50 
Although the findings of legislative bodies are generally entitled to great 
deference,51 a racial classification cannot rest on a generalized assertion that 
discrimination exists in society or in a particular agency.52 Because the 
concept of underrepresentation “rests upon the ‘completely unrealistic’ 
assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion 
to their representation in the local population,”53 underrepresentation or 
disparity is not sufficient to establish “a strong basis in evidence” for present 
effects of racial discrimination that would permit an agency to take race-
conscious action to fashion a remedy consistent with the Constitution.54 Instead, 
there must be “some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental 
unit involved. . . .”55 Findings of discrimination cannot be extrapolated from 
one governmental unit to another.56 Nor can findings of discrimination 
against one racial group be extrapolated to other racial groups.57 The 
judiciary rarely upholds governmental racial classifications.58 When it 
permits racial classification, the judiciary insists that the racial classification 
end once the government has eliminated the present day effects of the past 
discrimination.59 
                                                 
 48. Id. at 275-76. 
 49. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11. 
 50. Id. at 500. 
 51. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). 
 52. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964). 
 53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494 
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 54. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976); Mayor of 
Philadelphia v. Educ. Equity League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974). Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (“If our society is to continue to progress as a 
multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes 
retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury.”). 
 55. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 56. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508. See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). 
 57. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506 (“The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a 
practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination . . . suggests that perhaps 
the . . . purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.”). 
 58. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Additionally, the Court has 
approved—indeed required—the use of racial classifications in K-12 education as a means of 
remedying the present day effects of previous de jure discrimination within the school district. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Meckenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1971). 
 59. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 744, 
(2007). For a commentary on the higher education implications of the case, see Charles J. 
Russo & William E. Thro, Higher Education Implications of Parents Involved for Community 
Schools, 35 J. C. & U. L. 239 (2009). For a case reaching a similar result that foreshadowed the 
Supreme Court’s decision, see Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 
(D. Colo. 1995); Keyes v. Sch. District No. 1, 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
Colorado Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of race in student assignments). 
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Yet, in the context of higher education, a different paradigm prevails. 
First, although other governmental entities may only pursue racial 
classifications as a means of remedying the present day effects of past 
intentional discrimination by the governmental entity, public universities 
have an additional compelling governmental interest—obtaining the 
educational benefits of a diverse student body in higher education.60 Second, 
governmental findings of present day effects of past intentional 
discrimination receive severe skepticism, but “the decision to pursue ‘the 
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity’ . . . is, in 
substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, 
judicial deference is proper.”61 Third, while the Court insists “[t]he higher 
education dynamic does not change the narrow tailoring analysis of strict 
scrutiny applicable in other contexts,”62 its most recent decision suggests 
merely invoking “the educational benefits of diversity” is sufficient and that 
it need not identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether 
its plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests.63 Fourth, 
although the Court suggested in 2003 there would no need to use race to 
achieve diversity after 2028,64 higher education’s pursuit of diversity seems 
to have no logical endpoint. 
B. Freedom of Association for Student Religious Groups 
The right to express a particular viewpoint necessarily includes the 
right to associate with others who share that view. “An individual’s freedom 
to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of 
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State 
                                                 
 60. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003). Despite what many 
administrators may think, the Court’s embrace of “diversity” is “not an interest in simple 
ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed 
to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated 
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a 
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a 
single though important element.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 
(1978). “Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently unconstitutional’ to a 
compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’” Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 732 (2007). 
 61. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I] 
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). A university cannot impose a fixed quota or otherwise 
“define diversity as ‘some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its 
race or ethnic origin.’” Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307). Once, however, a university 
gives “a reasoned, principled explanation” for its decision, deference must be given “to the 
University’s conclusion, based on its experience and expertise, that a diverse student body 
would serve its educational goals.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 
(2016) [hereinafter Fisher II] (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419). 
 62. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 63. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
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unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were 
not also guaranteed.”65 “This right is crucial in preventing the majority from 
imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps 
unpopular, ideas.”66 “If the government were free to restrict individuals’ 
ability to join together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the 
First Amendment is intended to protect.”67 This freedom of association “is 
not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must 
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”68 
“Freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to 
associate.”69 “Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if 
associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share 
the interests and persuasions that underlie the association’s being.”70 “The 
forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s 
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a 
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”71 
Therefore, government may intrude on the freedom of association 
only “by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas that cannot be achieved through means significantly 
less restrictive of associational freedoms.”72 Courts are required to “examine 
whether or not the application of the state law would impose any ‘serious 
burden’ on the organization’s rights of expressive association.”73 Judges 
“give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its 
expression” and “to an association’s view of what would impair its 
expression.”74 It is not necessary for the organization’s core purpose to be 
expressive or for all members to agree with all aspects of the message.75 
Under this framework, the Court has upheld statutes requiring civic 
organizations to admit women,76 but has allowed both parade organizers77 
and the Boy Scouts to exclude homosexuals. 78 The cases have turned on 
                                                 
 65. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
 66. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000). 
 67. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006). 
 68. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
 69. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 70. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 n.22 
(1981); see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574-75 (2000). 
 71. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
 72. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 73. Dale, 530 U.S. at 685. 
 74. Id. at 653. 
 75. Id. at 655. 
 76. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1987); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-27. 
 77. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
572-73 (1995). 
 78. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-60. 
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whether the “the enforcement of these [policies]” would “materially interfere 
with the ideas that the organization sought to express.”79 
While all groups enjoy these constitutional rights to exclude those 
who disagree with the groups’ objectives,80 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC recognized that the First Amendment 
“gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot 
accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say 
about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own [leaders].”81 “By 
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, 
which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission 
through its appointments.”82 “According the state the power to determine 
which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment 
Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical 
decisions.”83 
Hosanna-Tabor establishes that religious groups have a right of 
absolute discretion to determine who their leaders will be. Logically, if an 
organization can restrict its leadership to those who adhere to the faith and 
basic principles, then the organization ought to be able to impose a similar 
requirement on membership. Consequently, the necessary inference of 
Hosanna-Tabor is that religious organizations, through the Religion 
Clauses,84 have greater associational freedoms than their secular counterparts 
do.85 
Yet, in higher education, a different paradigm prevails. In Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez,86 a sharply divided Supreme Court held that 
officials at a public institution in California might require a student religious 
group to admit all-comers from the student body, including those who 
disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of being a recognized student 
organization.87 Put another way, the Court declared that the government, 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 657. 
 80. The government may not require organizations to surrender this right as a 
condition of participating in a grant program or receiving some benefit. See Agency for Int’l 
Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013). 
 81. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
189 (2012). 
 82. Id. at 188. 
 83. Id. at 188-89. 
 84. “Responding somewhat incredulously to the government’s theory that whatever 
rights the church might have derive only from freedom of association, [Justice Scalia] said 
that ‘there, black on white in the text of the Constitution are special protections for 
religion.’” Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 839, 855 (2012). 
 85. Because the government may favor religion and religious entities over non-
religion and non-religious entities, such a result would not violate the Establishment Clause. 
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-24 (2005); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 
U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
 86. Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 87. Id. at 669. 
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through university officials, might force religious groups to choose between 
compromising their values and receiving benefits that other student groups 
receive as a matter of constitutional right. While the government “surely 
could not demand that all Christian groups admit members who believe that 
Jesus was merely human,”88 the government “may impose these very same 
requirements on students who wish to participate in a forum that is designed 
to foster the expression of diverse viewpoints.”89 As Professor Paulsen notes, 
the “holding is a fundamental negation of the right of Christian campus 
groups to freedom of speech, to freedom of association, and to the collective 
free exercise of religion—a First Amendment disaster trifecta.”90 
C. Due Process in Student Disciplinary Proceedings 
Unlike the legal traditions of other cultures, the Anglo-American-
Australasian legal tradition has required procedural due process before 
government deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property.91 “Due 
process is the foundation of any system of justice that seeks a fair outcome. 
Due process either protects everyone or it protects no one.”92 Due process 
prevents arbitrary governmental action,93 but it is ultimately a search for 
truth—did the individual actually do the action for which he is accused?94 All 
doubts are resolved in favor of the individual.95 The focus is on preventing 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 731 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). See 
also id. at 701 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 731 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
 90. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Disaster: The Worst Religious Freedom Case in Fifty 
Years, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 284 (2012). 
 91. Compare Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine, 
31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1997) (describing the lack of due process in the 
Ukraine), and Haibo He, The Dawn of the Due Process Principle in China, 22 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 57, 93 (2008) (stating that China does not have a tradition of due process), with 
Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1211-12 (2005) 
(describing the distinctive Anglo-American tradition of due process), and Belinda Wells & 
Michael Burnett, When Cultures Collide: An Australian Citizen’s Power to Demand the 
Death Penalty Under Islamic Law, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 19 (2000) (describing the 
application of due process in South Australia and its roots in English history). 
 92. Betsy DeVos, Secretary’s Prepared Remarks on Title IX Enforcement, Antonin 
Scalia Law School, George Mason University (September 7, 2017). 
 93. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
 94. See David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on 
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 473 (1992) 
(“[T]he search for truth is the reason the Constitution protects the right to confrontation, the 
right to compulsory process and the right to put on a defense.”). 
 95. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Reasonable Certainty and Reasonable Doubt, 81 MARQ. 
L. REV. 655, 658–59 (1998). 
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false convictions.96 As Blackstone noted, it is better for ten guilty men to go 
free than for one innocent man to be imprisoned.97 
Due process clearly applies when a public university seeks to expel 
a student for disciplinary reasons,98 but the judiciary has allowed universities 
to apply a less rigorous standard.99 Despite the life-altering consequences of 
an expulsion,100 a state university need not transplant “wholesale . . . the rules 
of procedure, trial and review which have evolved from the history and 
experience of courts.”101 Because student disciplinary hearings “are not 
criminal trials, and therefore need not take on many of those formalities,”102 
“neither rules of evidence nor rules of civil or criminal procedure need be 
applied.”103 Indeed, as long as the student has notice of the charges, an 
explanation of the evidence against him, opportunity to present his side of 
the story, and the evidence is sufficient, there is no constitutional violation.104 
Notice requires nothing more “than a statement of the charge against 
them.”105 As to the hearing, “[c]ross-examination, the right to counsel, the 
                                                 
 96. See Elizabeth Kaufer Busch, Sexual Assault: What’s Title IX Got To Do With It?, 
PERSP. IN POL. SCI. (July 28, 1997), http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vpps20 (discussing 
differences between Due Process approach and the Inquisitorial System).  
 97. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 (“[B]etter that ten guilty 
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”). 
 98. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985). The 
requirement to provide due process dates from the landmark decision in Dixon v. Alabama 
State Board of Education. 294 F.2d 150, 158–59 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 99. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Flaim v. Med. Coll. of 
Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 633–37 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases and analyzing the amount of 
process due in student disciplinary cases). 
 100. See Robert B. Groholski, Comment, The Right to Representation by Counsel in 
University Disciplinary Proceedings: A Denial of Due Process Law, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
739, 754–55 (1999); James M. Picozzi, Note, University Disciplinary Process: What’s Fair, 
What’s Due, and What You Don’t Get, 96 YALE L.J. 2132, 2138 (1987); Lisa Tenerowicz, 
Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for 
“Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 683 (2001). 
Indeed, in some states, if the student was expelled for sexual assault, that fact is noted on the 
student transcript. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:18. Given the potential liability for 
admitting a known sex offender, it will be difficult for students to transfer to other 
institutions. See Christopher M. Parent, Personal Fouls: How Sexual Assault by Football 
Players Is Exposing Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 617, 634–35 (2003) (explaining the liability that universities are exposed to 
because of student sexual harassment and suggesting that this may make them more cautious 
regarding which students they accept). In the Southeastern Conference, an athlete who is 
disciplined for sexual assault is ineligible to play at any other conference school. 2016- 2017 
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, Bylaw 14.1.19. 
 101. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
 102. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 635. 
 103. Id.; see also Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that a student disciplinary hearing is not required to follow the formal rules of evidence); 
Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding the 
same). 
 104. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). 
 105. Nash, 812 F.2d at 663. 
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right to transcript, and an appellate procedure have not been constitutional 
essentials, but where institutions have voluntarily provided them, courts have 
often cited them as enhancers of the hearing’s fairness.”106 While accused 
students have a right to consult legal counsel,107 there is no right to active 
participation by attorneys.108 In short, due process requires “only that 
[students] be afforded a meaningful hearing,”109 and that the decision be 
supported by substantial evidence.110 As long as a public university meets the 
constitutional standards, it need not follow its own internal procedures and 
rules in order to satisfy its constitutional obligations.111 
By itself, this judicial deference to the academy in the area of due 
process raises significant constitutional concerns, but the Obama 
Administration exacerbated those concerns.112 In its efforts to enforce Title 
                                                 
 106. 2 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
§ 9.4.2.2 (4th ed. 2006). 
 107. Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that “at most the 
student has a right to get the advice of a lawyer”); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 
(1st Cir. 1988) (noting that a student is not forbidden from obtaining legal counsel before or 
after the disciplinary hearing); see also Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reaffirming Osteen, 13 F.3d 221); Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 
F. Supp. 573, 582 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that procedures that afforded the student the 
opportunity to consult with an attorney outside of the disciplinary hearings were adequate). 
 108. Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, 
colleges and universities need not allow active representation by legal counsel or some other 
sort of campus advocate.”); see also Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (noting that during a disciplinary 
hearing, “the lawyer need not be allowed to participate in the proceeding in the usual way of 
trial counsel, as by examining and cross-examining witnesses and addressing the tribunal”); 
Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a 
student received due process, even though a practicing attorney did not conduct his defense, 
because two student-lawyers consulted extensively with the student’s attorney throughout 
the proceedings). 
 109. Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 630 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 110. Nash, 812 F.2d at 667-68. 
 111. Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that 
violations of federal due process are to be measured by federal standards, not by a state’s 
standard); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[P]rocedural rules 
created by state administrative bodies cannot, of themselves, serve as a basis for a separate 
protected liberty interest.”); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325, 329–30 (6th Cir. 1976) (“It is 
not every disregard of its regulations by a public agency that gives rise to a cause of action 
for violation of constitutional rights. Rather, it is only when the agency’s disregard of its 
rules results in a procedure which in itself impinges upon due process rights that a federal 
court should intervene in the decisional processes of state institutions.”); Winnick v. 
Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a university’s violation of its own 
procedures did not amount to a violation of federal due process). 
 112. See K.C. JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR, JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY: THE 
ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 9-10 (2017). 
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IX,113 the Obama Administration issued a “Dear Colleague Letter”114 setting 
out its view of the obligations of institutions receiving federal financial 
assistance under Title IX and its implementing regulations. This Dear 
Colleague letter “explains that the requirements of Title IX pertaining to 
sexual harassment also cover sexual violence, and lays out the specific Title 
IX requirements applicable to sexual violence.”115 
This Dear Colleague letter “was not adopted according to notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures; its extremely broad definition of 
‘sexual harassment’ has no counterpart in federal civil rights case law; and 
the procedures prescribed for adjudication of sexual misconduct are heavily 
weighted in favor of finding guilt.”116 Specifically, the Dear Colleague 
Letters (1) suggests institutions handle sexual assault cases with a single 
person serving as detective, prosecutor, judge, and jury;117 (2) maintains 
hearings are unnecessary; 118 (3) “implies that the school should not start the 
proceedings with a presumption of innocence, or even a stance of 
neutrality . . . [but with an assumption] any complaint is valid and the 
accused is guilty as charged;119 (4) forbids the consideration of the 
victim’s/survivor’s sexual history with anyone other than the accused 
student;120 (5) discourages cross-examination;121 (6) allows an appeal of not 
guilty verdicts:122 and (7) mandates a preponderance of the evidence—rather 
than clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt—standard 
for determining guilt.123 Although the Dear Colleague Letter has resulted in 
                                                 
 113. Any university that receives federal funds for any purpose is subject to Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012), and its implementing 
regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2015), which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in 
educational programs or activities operated by recipients of federal financial assistance. 
 114. See U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual 
Violence (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
 On April 24, 2014, additional guidance was issued by the OCR entitled “Questions and 
Answers on Title IX.” Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual 
Violence (Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter OCR Questions and Answers], http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. 
 Proposed regulations pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act were issued June 
20, 2014, and final regulations were issued on October 20, 2014. Violence Against Women 
Act, 34 C.F.R. § 668 (2014). 
 115. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 1. 
 116. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 779–80 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J., 
dissenting). 
 117. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114. 
 118. OCR Questions and Answers, supra note 114 at 25. With all due respect to the 
OCR, the Constitution does not permit the “single investigator” model for public institutions. 
 119. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED 
ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW 126 (2015). 
 120. OCR Questions and Answers, supra note 114 at 31. 
 121. Id. at 30-31. 
 122. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 12. 
 123. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 11. 
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an increased focus on the problems of sexual assault on campus,124 these 
suggestions and mandates further undermine due process.125 
II.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDICIARY’S DEFERENCE TO 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
A. Racial Preferences Have Significant Cost, Frequently Do Not 
Benefit Disadvantaged Students, and Are Unnecessary to the 
Achievement of Racial Diversity 
Although selective institutions generally view racial preferences as 
having few negative consequences, little social costs, an effective means of 
helping disadvantaged students, and necessary to achieving racial diversity, 
there are significant reasons to doubt these conclusions. 
First, at best it is debatable whether the benefits of racial preferences 
outweigh the costs.126 Derek Bok and William Bowen argued racial 
preferences have substantial benefits to universities and few downsides,127 
but Russell K. Neili presents a very different view.128 Drawing upon 
substantial social science data, Neili shows: (1) deep resentment of 
preferences among Whites and Asians;129 (2) lower academic performance 
among minorities who are admitted under racial preferences;130 (3) little 
impact on future earnings of minorities who benefit from preferences;131 (4) 
increased self-segregation by race on campuses;132 (5) no real economic 
benefits to Whites and Asians that attend racially diverse institutions;133 and 
(6) in the context of law schools, higher drop out and bar failure rates.134 
                                                 
 124. When these tragic events occur, the institution has a constitutional and legal 
obligation to support the victims/survivors. Reporting is going to be painful, but a university 
can make it as painless as possible. Specifically, a public school must make abundant 
resources available to the survivors—whether it is relocation of residence, schedule 
adjustments, medical assistance, or psychological counseling. Dear Colleague Letter, supra 
note 114 at 15–16. Of course, the institution must ensure the alleged perpetrator or the 
alleged perpetrator’s friends and allies do not retaliate against the victim/survivor. Id. at 16. 
 125. BERNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 124. 
 126. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638–39 
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 127. See generally DEREK BOK & WILLIAM BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998). 
 128. RUSSELL K. NIELI, WOUNDS THAT WILL NOT HEAL: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
OUR CONTINUING RACIAL DIVIDE (2012). 
 129. Id. at 172-79. 
 130. Id. at 163-72. 
 131. Id. at 143-48. 
 132. Id. at 186-87. 
 133. Id. at 215-22. 
 134. Id. at 222-32. 
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Second, racial preferences in admissions do not necessarily help 
those who are disadvantaged in contemporary society.135 “Race-based 
affirmative action buys some diversity for a relative few, but not serious 
inclusion,”136 but race does not, by definition, capture those who suffer the 
structural disadvantages of segregated schools and neighborhoods.137 Fifty 
years ago, “race and gender were appropriate markers for the type of 
exclusion practiced by most predominately white universities. Today, place 
is a more appropriate indicator of who gets excluded from consideration by 
admissions officers at selective institutions.”138 If public institutions wish to 
“help those [minority children] actually disadvantaged by [de facto] 
segregation,”139 their admissions committees must acknowledge “whites who 
do live in impoverished environs or attend high-poverty schools are no less 
deserving of special consideration—as is anyone who is actually 
disadvantaged by economic isolation.”140 Applicants from “low-opportunity 
places that rise, despite the undertow, deserve special consideration from 
selective schools. . . . And it should not matter what color they are or what 
nation they come from.”141 
Third, in many instances, racial preferences are unnecessary to the 
achievement of racial diversity.142 After California banned racial preferences 
through a state constitutional amendment, the University of California had 
an increase in both the number of minority applicants and number of 
minorities actually attending.143 In areas where many high schools are not 
racially integrated, simply admitting the top students from every high school 
                                                 
 135. See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF 
OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA (2014). Cashin argues preferences should emphasize: 
place, rather than race, as the focus of affirmative action for the pragmatic 
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Id. at xv. 
 136. Id. at xx. 
 137. Id. at xv. 
 138. Id. at xvi. 
 139. Id. at xv (emphasis omitted). 
 140. Id. at 79 (emphasis omitted). 
 141. Id. at 56. 
 142. As a matter of constitutional law, the judiciary must inquire “into whether a 
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Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). Put another way, the university must 
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 143. RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
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(2012). 
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can yield a significant amount of minority representation.144 If racial 
minorities are a disproportionate share of the poor,145 then a socio-economic 
preference has the potential to increase minority representation. 146 A similar 
logic applies to first generation students—applicants who will be the first in 
their families to attend college. Universities also could explore other creative 
race-neutral measures—such as quotas by region of the State—that might 
lead to increased minority representation. Each of these measures could 
promote or insure racial diversity without utilizing racial preferences. 
B. Forcing Religious Groups to Include Non-Believers 
Undermines Confident Pluralism 
On many public university campuses, the aspirations of social justice 
progressives conflict with the fundamental principles of classical 
liberalism.147 Wishing to satisfy the often vocal social justice progressives, 
university officials ignore or diminish the principles of classical liberalism.148 
Such an approach is constitutionally problematic and, ultimately, leads to 
totalitarianism.149 The better approach is John Inazu’s call for a Confident 
Pluralism150 that “conduces to civil peace and advances democratic 
consensus-building.”151 
                                                 
 144. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. 
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DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016). 
 151. Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 734 (2010) (Alito, J., joined by 
Roberts, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Gays & Lesbians for 
Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 35, Christian Legal Soc’y v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 08-1371)). 
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Expanding upon the ideas of other scholars,152 Inazu describes a 
“Confident Pluralism” as “rooted in the conviction that protecting the 
integrity of one’s own beliefs and normative commitments does not depend 
on coercively silencing opposing views.”153 Emphasizing both an inherent 
distrust of state power and a “commitment to letting differences coexist, 
unless and until persuasion eliminates those differences,”154 Inazu “seeks to 
maximize the spaces where dialogue and persuasion can coexist alongside 
deep and intractable differences about beliefs, commitments, and ways of 
life” and to “resist coercive efforts aimed at getting people to ‘fall in line’ 
with the majority.”155 His vision requires individuals to embrace tolerance,156 
humility,157 and patience,158 but his paradigm also requires the government 
to respect associational freedom,159 ensure meaningful access to public 
forums,160 and provide funding to support pluralism.161 
Although Americans disagree about “the purpose of our country, the 
nature of the common good, and the meaning of human flourishing,”162 we 
agree on the necessity of “limiting state power, of encouraging persuasion 
over coercion, and of supporting a robust civil society.”163 This “modest 
unity” underlying Confident Pluralism includes both a premise of inclusion 
and a premise of dissent.164 The Inclusion Premise “aims for basic 
membership in the political community to those within our boundaries.”165 
                                                 
 152. In the law review article that formed the foundation for his later book, Inazu 
explains: 
The underpinnings of a confident pluralism are also advanced by a number of 
prominent scholars. Kenneth Karst insists that “[o]ne of the points of any 
freedom of association must be to let people make their own definitions of 
community.” William Eskridge reaches a similar conclusion: “The state must 
allow individual nomic communities to flourish or wither as they may, and the 
state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the triumph of one 
community over all others.” And David Richards reflects, “The best of 
American constitutional law rests. . . . on the role it accords resisting voice, and 
the worst on the repression of such voice.” 
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The Dissent Premise recognizes individuals “must be able to reject the norms 
established by the broader political community with our own lives and 
voluntary groups.”166 In order to recognize both inclusion and dissent, Inazu 
calls on the broader political community to respect associational freedom,167 
ensure meaningful access to public forums,168 and provide funding to support 
pluralism.169 Although our current constitutional framework requires a large 
degree of associational freedom, access to public forums, and public funding, 
Inazu argues that current doctrine “falls short and is headed in the wrong 
direction.”170 His vision of Confident Pluralism requires the courts to 
“redefine and reimagine” doctrine concerning voluntary groups, expression 
in public places, and public funding of private expression.171 
Allowing student religious groups to determine their own 
membership is essential to Confident Pluralism.172 If the public institution 
wishes to promote understanding and dynamic discussion, a policy of forced 
inclusion “could be completely counterproductive, indeed nonsensical—e.g. 
forcing a Jewish club to allow Muslim or Christian Officers.”173 Additionally, 
as Robert George observed, “the right to religious freedom by its very nature 
includes the right to leave a religious community whose convictions one no 
longer shares and the right to join a different community of faith, if that is 
where one’s conscience leads.”174 Forcing a religious organization to accept 
those who disagree with its core tenets is to begin the process of changing 
the nature of organization.175 If a Catholic organization is forced to accept 
Protestants, then the organization will be less Catholic and, in time, may not 
be Catholic at all. As Inazu explains, “[o]ne reason that associational freedom 
is the fundamental building block of a confident pluralism is that it shields 
groups and spaces from the reaches of state power. Without this initial 
sorting . . . the aspirations of a confident pluralism become functionally 
unworkable.”176 Put another way, Confident Pluralism requires us to 
recognize that People of Faith should be able to study the Bible, Torah, 
Koran, or sacred text without including secularists who reject any notion of 
the divine. 
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C. Diminished Due Process Protections Do Not Benefit the Sexual 
Assault Victim-Survivors 
Responding to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, public institutions 
have created parallel criminal justice systems to deal with sexual assaults.177 
Like other student disciplinary proceedings involving life-altering 
consequences, these proceedings frequently have diminished due process 
protections.178 Indeed, a campus sexual assault hearing often resembles the 
Star Chamber of sixteenth and seventeenth century England.179 Thus, the 
possibility of erroneous outcomes—a false conviction—increases. Yet, this 
increased possibility of error has no corresponding benefit. “The notion that 
a school must diminish due process rights to better serve the ‘victim’ only 
creates more victims.”180 
Public institutions frequently have ignored their obligations to 
support the victim-survivors.181 Following the decline of the in loco parentis 
doctrine, universities have tolerated a student-life culture that emphasizes 
heavy drinking and casual sex.182 Such an environment does not prevent 
sexual assault and, indeed, indirectly encourages it.183 When students have 
come forward with allegations of sexual assault, campus officials often failed 
to: (1) provide adequate psychological counseling; (2) grant 
accommodations, such as changes in class schedule or housing; or (3) prevent 
retaliation by the alleged perpetrator’s supporters.184 If a victim/survivor 
wished to pursue justice against an alleged attacker, the university often 
simply referred them to the criminal justice system, where police and 
                                                 
 177. See Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that Title 
IX sexual assault proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, Younger Abstention 
should apply). 
 178. JOHNSON & TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 9-10, 85-116. 
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at their own discretion”). 
 183. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY 2-5–
2-8 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (noting that substance 
abuse and prior consensual sexual activity are major risk factors for sexual assault). 
 184. See Cantalupo, supra note 181, at 214–16 (describing instances in which 
university officials failed to provide appropriate support, protection, or accommodations for 
sexual assault victims, or failed to act at all). 
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prosecutors would not pursue ambiguous cases.185 If the school initiated 
student disciplinary proceedings, it was often a horrific experience for the 
victim/survivor.186 Sadly, at some institutions, the alleged perpetrator’s status 
as an athlete or the child of a wealthy donor apparently influenced the 
decision to pursue discipline or the sanction involved.187 
When a student makes an allegation of sexual assault, a public 
institution has a constitutional, legal, and moral obligation to support the 
victim-survivor.188 Reporting is going to be painful, but a university can 
make it as painless as possible. Specifically, a public school must make 
abundant resources available to the survivors—whether it is relocation of 
residence, schedule adjustments, medical assistance, or psychological 
counseling.189 Of course, the institution must ensure the alleged perpetrator 
or the alleged perpetrator’s friends and allies do not retaliate against the 
victim/survivor.190 
The institution has these obligations regardless of any uncertainties 
or ambiguities about the case. A student who sincerely believes she was 
sexually assaulted is going to manifest the trauma of a rape victim-survivor 
even though the alleged perpetrator may claim innocence or the evidence is 
at best inconclusive. The student must receive counseling and 
accommodation regardless of whether the institution successfully pursues 
disciplinary action. 
These obligations are in addition to—not in place of—the 
obligations to the individual accused of the sexual assault. Fulfilling the 
institutional obligations to the victim/survivor will not harm the accused. 
Diminishing the due process protections for the accused will not help the 
victim-survivor. 
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
If academic administrators are no more angelic than other 
constitutional actors are, then their actions should receive doubt, not 
deference. Ending the deference to higher education and, thus, restoring the 
constitutional symmetry is possible. Such an effort must focus on state law, 
                                                 
 185. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Decriminalizing” Campus Institutional Responses to 
Peer Sexual Violence, 38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 489–90 n.28 (2012) (noting that many 
institutions’ sexual assault reporting guidelines emphasize contacting police). 
 186. Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads, supra note 181, at 214–16. 
 187. BERNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 123. 
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 189. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 15–16. 
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2018] NO ANGELS IN ACADEME 49 
federal statutory or regulatory changes, and, ultimately, overruling or 
limiting Supreme Court precedents. 
A. Treat Racial Preferences in Higher Education in the Same 
Manner as Racial Preferences in Other Contexts 
In the context of racial preferences, higher education officials have 
two advantages over other constitutional actors. First, university officials 
have the option of using the educational benefits of a diverse student body as 
a compelling governmental interest.191 Second, when they choose to pursue 
this interest, public university administrators receive far greater deference on 
both the need to pursue the objective and the means of achieving that 
objective.192 Although there are serious doubts that racial preferences 
actually increase minority enrollments at selective private institutions or at 
flagship state universities, both racial diversity and the use of racial 
preferences to achieve diversity are sacrosanct in higher education.193 If 
either advantage were eliminated, university leaders would become 
apoplectic. Yet, there are reasons to believe that such a paradigm will be 
legal, if not constitutional, reality. 
First, the People of individual states may well adopt state 
constitutional provisions mandating an end to racial preferences.194 In Schutte 
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, & Immigrant Rights 
& Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, 195 the Court rejected a federal 
constitutional challenge to such measures.196 As the public continues to doubt 
both the wisdom of university officials and the efficacy of racial preferences, 
other states may see similar measures. 
Second, the Supreme Court may well reverse itself on the issue of 
whether obtaining educational benefits of diversity is a compelling 
governmental interest. Three current Justices—Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Alito—have expressed, at least implicitly, their 
disapproval of diversity as a compelling governmental interest.197 Although 
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50 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5: 27 
Justice Gorsuch has not addressed the issue as either a Justice or a Tenth 
Circuit judge, the similarities between his judicial philosophy and Justice 
Scalia’s judicial philosophy suggest he may reject diversity as a compelling 
governmental interest.198 If the three Justices opposed to diversity remain 
consistent, if Justice Gorsuch is opposed to diversity as a compelling interest, 
and if one of the four pro-diversity Justices retires and is replaced by a Justice 
opposed to diversity, then the diversity rationale is doomed. Given three pro-
diversity Justices are over seventy-nine and given all three embrace diversity 
as a compelling governmental interest, it seems quite likely that a pro-
diversity justice will leave the Court before the 2020 election. 
Third, even if the Court preserves diversity as a compelling 
governmental interest, the Court may well apply less deference to higher 
education officials’ efforts to achieve diversity. In other words, the narrow 
tailoring inquiry may actually have teeth. Although Justice Kennedy has 
accepted diversity as compelling governmental interest, he generally was 
skeptical of the means to achieve the end.199 Indeed, in Fisher I, Justice 
Kennedy—writing for the Court—deferred to university judgment as to 
whether to pursue diversity,200 but refused to find that university officials 
were entitled to no deference as to the means of achieving that end.201 
Although Justice Kennedy—again writing for the Court—was far more 
deferential to the administrators in Fisher II,202 he emphasized the 
“University’s program is sui generis.”203 In a future case involving a 
university program that is not inherently unique, Justice Kennedy—and the 
four Justices opposed to diversity—may well return to the non-deferential 
approach of Fisher I. 
B. Student Religious Organizations May Define Their Own 
Membership 
In the context of student religious groups, university administrators 
are allowed to do something that no other constitutional actor can do—force 
a religious organization to admit persons who reject fundamental tenets of 
the faith. Yet, there are several reasons to think public university 
administrators may face new limitations. 
First, in some states, state law may protect the rights of student 
religious groups. Because state constitutions often are more protective of 
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2018] NO ANGELS IN ACADEME 51 
individual liberty,204 a student group may have a state constitutional right to 
exclude those who disagree with the group’s views. 205 Indeed, since the 
Burger Court’s decisions prompted a revival of state constitutional law in the 
early 1970’s,206 “it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state 
constitutional questions.”207 Although the issue apparently is one of national 
first impression, it would not be surprising if a state court determined that its 
state constitution prohibited the government from indirectly forcing an 
organization to admit members who disagreed with the organization’s 
objectives.208 Moreover, state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts209 
prohibit government from imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise 
of religion unless there is a compelling governmental interest pursued 
through the least restrictive means.210 To the extent that a student group’s 
position is the result of religious belief, these state laws seem to prohibit 
government from indirectly forcing the inclusion of dissenters. Furthermore, 
in two some states, there are specific state statutes guaranteeing the right of 
religious groups to exclude those who do not embrace the faith.211 
Second, the Court may well overrule Christian Legal Society. Two 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Hosanna-Tabor and Alliance for Open 
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Society collectively undermine the result in Christian Legal Society.212 The 
first, Hosanna-Tabor, establishes that religious groups have a right of 
religious autonomy—absolute discretion to determine whom its leaders will 
be.213 Logically, if an organization can restrict its leadership to those who 
adhere to the faith, then the organization ought to be able to impose a similar 
requirement on membership. That is the opposite result of Christian Legal 
Society. The second, Agency for International Development v. Alliance for 
Open Society International, Inc.,214 represents a revival and redefinition of 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—government may impose 
conditions that define the program, but may not impose conditions that reach 
outside the program. As a result, government cannot force a religious group 
to surrender its religious autonomy rights as a condition of receiving some 
government subsidy or benefit—such as university recognition or access to 
student activity funds.215 That outcome also is the direct opposite of Christian 
Legal Society. In sum, Hosanna-Tabor and Alliance for Open Society 
collectively contradict the result in Christian Legal Society.216 
Third, even if the Court does not overrule Christian Legal Society, it 
may limit the holding to circumstances where all student groups must admit 
all students. Some Universities allow political groups to exclude those who 
disagree with the groups’ objectives, but force religious groups to admit 
everyone. 217 Such a policy requires religious groups to be treated differently 
than secular organizations. In Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, the Court 
held that government could not treat religious organizations differently from 
secular organizations.218 That holding requires universities to treat student 
religious organizations in the same manner as student secular 
organizations.219 
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C. Enhanced Due Process Protections for Life-Altering 
Disciplinary Proceedings  
Given the potentially life-altering consequences of a Title IX sexual 
assault proceeding, there is a need for enhanced due process protections. 
These enhanced protections involve three critical elements: (1) strict 
separation of roles; (2) a hearing focused on a search for the truth; and (3) a 
standard of proof that is high enough to prevent wrongful convictions. Each 
of these is detailed below. 
First, the institutions must strictly separate the investigative, 
prosecutorial, adjudicative, and appellate functions. America’s criminal 
justice system acknowledges the possibility that individuals may abuse their 
power; it disperses authority among multiple individuals and contains 
structural safeguards to prevent abuse of power.220 A prosecutor must obtain 
a grand jury indictment or preliminary hearing finding of probable cause.221 
A single juror can prevent a finding of guilt.222 A guilty verdict, but not an 
acquittal, is subject to appellate review.223 The authority to imprison an 
individual is never concentrated in an individual.224 While neither our 
constitutional system nor our criminal justice system operates perfectly, 
avoiding concentrations of power and authority makes it more likely that 
society, rather than a faction,225 will prevail and only the guilty will go to jail. 
The same principles must apply when a public university confronts 
an allegation that could result in expulsion. The individuals who investigate 
the allegation must not be involved in the decision to prosecute, the 
determination of guilt, or the appellate review. The individuals who 
determine whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings or whether to 
negotiate some sort of “plea bargain” must not be involved in the 
investigation or the adjudication of guilt.226 The individuals who determine 
whether the student is, in fact, guilty must not be involved with the 
investigative phase, the decision to charge, or the appellate review. The 
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appellate panel must have not be involved in the investigation, prosecution, 
or hearing and, more importantly, should have the right to reverse on any 
legal or factual ground.227 
Second, the hearing must be a search for the truth of guilt or 
innocence. The accused individual must have access to an attorney and the 
attorney must be able to actively participate.228 Additionally, in order to 
ensure the correct result, the accused student must have access to all 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.229 There should be no surprises at the 
hearing.230 Because the student is presumed innocent, the institution has the 
burden of proving guilt.231 Since “[c]ross-examination is the principal means 
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does not have to actively participate in the student’s defense). 
 229. See Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1210–11 (2000) (stating that criminal procedural rules require the 
government to produce all material and exculpatory evidence upon request). Schools should 
apply the same rules to disciplinary proceedings. 
 230. While this proposition may seem obvious, it presents special problems in the 
context of the victim’s previous sexual history. “Over the last few decades, almost all 
American courts have limited the extent to which accused rapists can bring in the sexual past 
of an alleged victim. This ensures that rape trials are not in effect also putting the victim on 
trial.” BERNSTEIN, supra note 119, at 125 (stating that public universities must follow the 
same approach as the federal rules of evidence FED. R. EVID. 412 or applicable state law.). 
See also Pamela J. Fisher, State v. Alvey: Iowa’s Victimization of Defendants Through the 
Overextension of Iowa’s Rape Shield Law, 76 IOWA L. REV. 835, 835 (collecting rape shield 
laws from most states). 
 231. See Barton L. Ingraham, The Right to Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the 
Burden of Proof, and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O’Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 559, 562–63 (1996) (noting that although the prosecution in a criminal case 
has the burden to prove all the elements of the crime charged, the defendant in a criminal 
case has no burden of proof). 
 Although some insist victims/survivors have “procedural equality,” Nancy Chi 
Cantalupo, Address: The Civil Rights Approach to Campus Sexual Violence, 28 REGENT U. 
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by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 
tested,”232 there must be some form of cross-examination.233 As a further 
safeguard against wrongful convictions, any finding of guilt should be 
unanimous.234 Finally, there should be no appellate review of a “not guilty” 
verdict.235 
Third, the standard of proof must be high enough to avoid wrongful 
convictions. In the criminal justice system, a conviction for sexual assault 
requires the prosecution to prove every element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt (99% certainty).236 However, if a student disciplinary 
system uses a lesser standard, such as clear and convincing evidence (75%), 
or, as the OCR guidance mandates, a mere preponderance of the evidence 
(50.01%),237 then the likelihood that an innocent person will be found guilty 
increases dramatically.238 In order to minimize the possibility of false 
convictions, institutions should be required to utilize a clear and convincing 
evidence standard or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.239 
This vision of enhanced due process is an aspiration, but there are 
reasons to believe it may soon be a reality. 
First, the Trump Administration has rescinded the Obama 
Administration’s Dear Colleague Letter240 and announced its intention to 
promulgate regulations promulgated through “a transparent notice and 
                                                 
L. REV. 185, 193 (2016), the governmental actor cannot transfer its responsibilities to a 
private individual. The matter is not Victim/Survivor v. Alleged Perpetrator; the matter is 
Public University v. Alleged Perpetrator. It is the public university that has the constitutional 
and legal obligation to remedy known incidents of sex discrimination, including sexual 
assault. It is the alleged perpetrator who violated the university’s rules. 
 232. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
 233. Although trial attorneys strive to perfect the technique of leading questions, the 
veracity and accuracy of a witness’s testimony can be questioned and refuted without 
leading questions. Instead, cross-examination can take place through the hearing officer or 
by requiring advocates to ask more open-ended questions. 
 234. Cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (holding that there is a 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury if the jury only has six members). 
 235. The Dear Colleague Letter required that victim/survivors be able to appeal a not 
guilty verdict. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114 at 11. 
 236. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (stating that the Constitution 
requires application of the reasonable doubt standard for all criminal convictions). 
 237. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 114, at 11. 
 238. See John Villasenor, Probabilistic Framework for Modeling False Title IX 
“Convictions” Under the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 15 L., PROBABILITY, & 
RISK 223 (2016). 
 239. To be sure, as I explained elsewhere, under current due process jurisprudence, it is 
possible to provide due process while utilizing the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
See William E. Thro, No Clash of Constitutional Values: Respecting Freedom & Equality in 
Public University Sexual Assault Cases, 28 REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 197, 209 (2016). My point is 
that the existing due process jurisprudence should change for proceedings with potentially 
life altering consequences. 
 240. See U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Sept. 22, 
2017), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USED/bulletins/1b8ba66 (announcing the 
withdrawal of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter). 
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comment process to incorporate the insights of all parties in developing a 
better way.”241 Declaring “the era of ‘rule by letter’ is over,”242 the Secretary 
of Education called for a new paradigm where “[e]very survivor of sexual 
assault must be taken seriously. Every student accused of sexual misconduct 
must know that guilt is not predetermined.”243 In the interim, the Department 
of Education issued a new question and answer guidance, which provides far 
greater flexibility than the Obama Administration’s Dear Colleague Letter.244 
While any new regulations implementing Title IX will be limited to the 
context of Title IX sexual assault proceedings, the enhanced due process 
measures in one context likely will lead to similar measures in other contexts 
involving life altering events. 
Second, when confronted with due process claims in the Title IX 
Sexual Assault context, the courts are showing less deference to university 
officials.245 In a case involving Younger abstention,246 the Sixth Circuit has 
found Title IX sexual assault proceedings to be “akin to criminal 
prosecution.”247 In cases where the credibility of the Complaining Witness is 
at issue, the Sixth Circuit held that the Complaining Witness must be visible 
and audible to the fact finder and must be subjected to some form of cross-
examination.248 Taken together, the two Sixth Circuit decisions suggest a far 
less deferential attitude toward university administrators and university 
procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Public university administrators are not angels; they are human 
beings. Like all human beings, they “have sinned and fall short of the glory 
of God.”249 Like all human beings, have they unconscious biases that color 
their attitudes and reactions to others.250 University officials have laudable 
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 242. Id. at 3. 
 243. Id. at 4. 
 244. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR C.R., Q & A ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (Sept. 
2017). 
 245. K.C. Johnson has identified sixty-seven cases where the courts have denied a 
university’s motion to dismiss. See Complaints and Lawsuits, SAVE (Sept. 20, 2017) 
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 246. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“This underlying reason for 
restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an 
even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state 
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate 
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare 
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their 
separate ways.”). 
 247. Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 248. See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 402-04 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 249. Romans 3:23 (English Standard Version). 
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ends—achieving racial diversity, making the LGTBQ community feel 
welcome and included, and supporting the victim-survivors of sexual assault. 
In their pursuit of these ends, they use constitutionally dubious means. They 
engage in the “sordid business” of racial sorting,251 deny the Constitution’s 
“special solicitude” toward religion,252 and employ “shameful” procedures 
“wholly un-American and . . . anathema to the system of governance to 
which our Founders pledged their lives over two hundred years ago.”253 
Although the judiciary vigorously enforces constitutional limitations 
in non-higher education contexts, when confronted with claims from 
academe, the judiciary abdicates and defers. The courts never tolerate racial 
classifications except when university administrators pursue them. Religious 
organizations enjoy absolute autonomy except when their members are 
students.254 Civil and criminal courts respect due process, but campus 
disciplinary proceedings—which have life changing consequences— 
disregard the principles of Magna Carta.255 
This judicial deference must end. A Republic “conceived in liberty” 
and “dedicated to the proposition that all . . . are created equal”256 cannot 
tolerate higher education administrators betraying these principles. 
Fortunately, the Constitution’s Calvinist features allow for correction. 
Because the Constitution divides sovereignty between the States and the 
National Government, the State can impose limitations where the federal 
judiciary does not.257 Exercising its enumerated powers in the space between 
what the Constitution prohibits and what the Constitution requires, the 
National Government—through statutes or regulations—may limit the 
discretion of higher education. Where previous decisions depart from the 
original public meaning or a construction consistent with original public 
meaning, the Supreme Court can—and should—overrule its previous 
interpretation.258 
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